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Abstract
The indirect involvement in the unethical behavior represented by violation of regulation is believed to lessen the responsibility 
for the accident occurred due to the unethical behavior as compared to the direct involvement in the unethical behavior. It has 
been explored how punishment changes when violation of rule or defection is committed indirectly in decision making. It was 
hypothesized that we tend to be insensitive to violation, defection, or unethical behavior in decision making when it was 
indirectly intermediated. In other words, we explored whether allowing indirect actions leads to increased uncooperative decision 
in decision making. These results mean that the punishment to the indirectness does not always get smaller. The punishment to
the indirectness gets smaller only when the reward by Players B and D are larger. In conclusion, the hypothesis that the indirect 
intermediation reduces the punishment and thus lessons the responsibility for the unethical violation behavior is true for the
limited condition.
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1. Introduction
A lot of studies have been carried out on punishment and fairness from the perspectives of both experimental 
economics and applied cognitive psychology. Axelrod [1] showed that punishment can lead to greater social 
welfare. Fehr and Schmidt [2] and Bolton and Ockenfels [3] provided models of outcome-based fairness as models 
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of punishment and fairness. Rabin [4] and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [5] defined fairness in terms of how good 
our action is relative to our alternatives and our belief on how nice we are. Falk and Fischbacher [6] and Falk, Fehr, 
and Fischbacher [7] proposed a model that combined intentions and fairness. Charness and Rabin [8] provide 
experimental evidence that fairness judgment and reciprocity decision are dependent on the welfare of the poorest 
player. Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels [9] provided experimental evidence that our perception of fairness also 
depends on prior equity. 
Frederick and Kahneman [10] showed that punishment and moral judgment are not merely responses to the 
objective wrongness of an action. Greene and Haidt [11] suggested that moral preferences are at least partially 
derived from an intuitive or emotional reaction. We tend to be unable to explain why we made the moral judgment 
that we did. Greene [12] showed that this might be explained by a dual process model of the brain. In such a way, 
the relationship between punishment and fairness is a very complicated social issue, and is approached from a 
variety of perspectives such as experimental economics, behavioral economics, and cognitive psychology.
According to New York Times (March 12, 2006, Business section), Merck sold the right to a cancer drug to a 
small pharmaceutical company. The pharmaceutical company immediately raised the price charge to patients by a 
factor of seven and later by a factor of ten. Although firms often worry about negative reactions to price-gouging as 
pointed by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [13], Merck tried to mitigate the negative reaction of patients by 
intermediation by the small pharmaceutical company. Many studies have investigated whether intermediation 
reduces punishment or not [2],[4]-[9],[14]-[18]. 
Coffman [14] examined how punishment changed when the transgressor indirectly interacted with the injured 
party. In other words, it was explored how third party punishment for keeping money at the expense of a poorer 
player changed when an intermediacy actor was included in the transaction. He showed that intermediation reduced 
punishment predominantly because the selfish player did not directly interact with the poorer player when 
intermediation was used, and concluded that allowing indirect actions might lead to increased anti-social behavior. 
In Cushman [19], the reward of Player B (indirectly take part in DG (dictator game) instead of Player A) and D 
(monitor DG and has a right to reduce Player A’s payoff by monitoring the situation) was fixed to $5. It is expected 
that the behavior (evaluation of Player A) of Player D changes as a function of the reward of Player B and Player D. 
Without exploring the effect of reward of Player B and Player D on the punishment by Player D, we cannot ge a 
systematic insight into whether intermediation reduces punishment or not. 
On the basis of the discussion above, the indirect involvement in the unethical behavior represented by violation 
of regulation is believed to lessen the responsibility for the accident occurred due to the unethical behavior as 
compared to the direct involvement in the unethical behavior. Thus, it has been explored how punishment changes 
when violation of rule or defection is committed indirectly in decision making. It was hypothesized that we tend to 
be insensitive to violation, defection, or unethical behavior in decision making when it was indirectly intermediated 
and when the reward of Player B and Player D was high. In other words, we explored whether allowing indirect 
actions leads to increased uncooperative decision in decision making as a function of reward of Player B and Player 
D.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Twenty undergraduate or graduate students (eleven male and ten female) aged from 20 to 23 years old took part 
in the experiment. All had no knowledge or skill in psychology or behavioral economics. All agreed with the 
participation in the experiment after receiving a brief explanation of the aim and the contents of the experiment.
2.2. Task
Four-person dictator game (DG) was used to verify the hypothesis above. Four players A, B, C, and D are 
involved in this game. Player A owns the right to split $10 with Player C, and decides how to split $10. Player C has 
no right to reject the offer by Player A, and must simply obey Player A’s decision (Case 1 in Fig.1). Player A can 
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sell the right to play the dictator game to Player B by paying Player B less than $10. Player B has no right to reject 
Player A’s decision (Case 2 in Fig.2). 
Player D has the right to reduce Player A’s payoff by monitoring the situation of dictator game according to 
whether Player A plays with player C directly or sells the right to Player B. Players A, B, and D can receive reward 
for participation in this experiment. Player D cannot receive reward for participation in DG. Player A, Player B, and 
Player D are paid according to DG.
The experimental procedure was simulated and programmed on a PC. It must be noted that the participants only 
played the role of Player D. The computer agent acted the roles of Players A, B, and C.
2.3. Design and procedure
The within-subject experimental factors were: directness of the dictator game (directly play DG (direct condition) 
or sell the right to play DG to Player B (indirect condition)) and the reward of Player A, B, and D for participation in 
this game (A:B:D=$10:$5:$5, A:B:D=$10:$2.5:$2.5, A:B:D=$10:$10:$10, A:B:D=$10:$15:$15).  
The between-subject experimental factor was instruction for evaluating the behavior of Player A. For one group, 
the participants were required to place great emphasis on properly monitoring the behavior of Player A and decide 
how much the participants punish the behavior of Player A on the basis of the careful monitoring of Player A’s 
behavior. For another group, such a highlighted instruction was not given to the participant. Ten participants were 
randomly allocated to each condition. 
The order of performance of eight conditions by directness of the dictator game and the reward of Player A, B, 
and D for participation was randomized across the participants.
 
D
AB CSplit $10 with 
Player C
Player A own the right to split $10 with 
Player C. Player C has no say in the 
decision by Player A.
䐟
Punish Player A
Player D can punish Player A 
any amount until the money A 
earned, and it is possible to 
punish Player A at all.
䐠
Case 1
Players A, B, D will be 
given show up fee plus the 
money made during the 
experimental game. 
Player C is given only the 
money allocated by 
Player A or B during the 
experimental game.
Fig. 1. Explanation of the procedure of experiment (Case 1: When Player A directly play DG with Player C).
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D
AB C
䐠
䐡
Case 2
Sell the right to
split $10 with 
Player C
䐟
Player A decides how much to sell 
the right for.  Player B has no say 
in the decision made by Player A.
Players A, B, D will be given show 
up fee plus the money made 
during the experimental game. 
Player C is given only the money 
allocated by Player A or B during 
the experimental game.
Player D can punish Player A 
any amount until the money A 
earned, and it is possible to 
punish Player A at all.
Punish Player A
Split $10 with Player C Player B own the right to split $10 with 
Player C. Player C has no say in the 
decision by Player B.
Fig. 2. Explanation of the procedure of experiment (Case 2: Intermediation condition, Player A sells the right to play the dictator game to Player 
B by paying Player B less than $10. Player B directly play DG with Player C).
3. Results
First, the results of no-instruction condition are mentioned. In this condition, the participants (Player D) were 
merely explained the contents of the experimental game, and required to punish Player A according to the 
predetermined rule. For B:D= $5:$5, B:D=$2.5:$2.5, B:D=$10:$10, B:D=$15:$15, Player D’s amount of 
punishment to Player A in the indirect condition was larger than that in the direct condition irrespective of the profit 
of Player A (see Fig.3(a)-(b)). This indicates that indirect intermediation by the right to play DG to Player B does 
not always lead to less punishment. These results conflicts with the finding by Coffman (2010) that the indirect 
intermediation reduces the punishment and thus lessons the responsibility for the unethical violation behavior. 
Second, the results of instruction condition are summarized. In this condition, the participants were required to 
place great emphasis on properly monitoring the behavior of Player A and decide how much the participants punish 
the behavior of Player A on the basis of the careful monitoring of Player A’s behavior. For B:D= $5:$5, 
B:D=$2.5:$2.5, B:D=$10:$10, Player D’s amount of punishment to Player A in the indirect condition was larger 
than that in the direct condition irrespective of the profit of Player A (see Fig.4 (a)). These results also conflicts with 
the finding by Coffman (2010). On the other hand, for B:D=$15:$15, Player D’s amount of punishment to Player A 
in the indirect condition was smaller than that in the direct condition when the profit of Player A was more than $6 
(see Fig.4(b)). This agreed with the result of Coffman (2006) that the punishment to the indirect condition gets 
smaller when the reward of Players B and D was larger than other condition.
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Fig. 3. (a) Mean punishment as a function of profit of Player A and whether the right to play DG with Player C was sold to Player B or not 
(B=D=$2.5; Not instructed to place great emphasis on properly monitoring the behavior of Player A); (b) Mean punishment as a function of 
profit of Player A and whether the right to play DG with Player C was sold to Player B or not (B=D=$15; Not instructed to place great emphasis 
on properly monitoring the behavior of Player A).
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Fig. 4. (a) Mean punishment as a function of profit of Player A and whether the right to play DG with Player C was sold to Player B or not
(B=D=$5; Instructed to place great emphasis on properly monitoring the behavior of Player A); (b) Mean punishment as a function of profit of 
Player A and whether the right to play DG with Player C was sold to Player B or not (B=D=$15; Instructed to place great emphasis on properly 
monitoring the behavior of Player A).
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4. Discussion
Coffman [14] examined how punishment changed when the transgressor (Player A) indirectly interacted with the 
injured party (Player C) by exploring how third party (Player D) punishment for keeping money at the expense of a 
poorer player (Player C) changed when an intermediacy actor (Player B) was included in the transaction. Coffman 
[14] hypothesized that intermediation reduced punishment predominantly because the selfish player did not directly 
interact with the poorer player when intermediation was used. He concluded that intermediation by allowing indirect 
actions might lead to increased anti-social behavior. 
In Coffman [14], the reward of Player B (indirectly take part in DG (dictator game) instead of Player A) and D 
(monitor DG and has a right to reduce Player A’s payoff according to the situation) was fixed to $5. Without 
exploring the effect of reward of Player B and Player D on the punishment by Player D, we cannot get a systematic 
insight into whether intermediation reduces punishment or not. Therefore, we hypothesized that the evaluation of 
Player A by Player D changes as a function of the reward of Player B and Player D. In other words, the evaluation 
of Player A by Player D might change according to the reward of Player B and Player D. 
Thus, it has been explored how punishment changes when violation of rule or defection is committed indirectly 
in decision making. It was hypothesized that we tend to be insensitive to violation, defection, or unethical behavior 
in decision making when it was indirectly intermediated and when the reward of Player B and Player D was high. In 
other words, we explored whether allowing indirect actions leads to increased uncooperative decision in decision 
making as a function of reward of Player B and Player D.  
For both non-instruction and instruction conditions, Player D’s amount of punishment to Player A in the indirect 
condition was larger than that in the direct condition irrespective of the profit of Player A (see Fig.3 (a)-(b), 
Fig.4(a)). This indicates that indirect intermediation by selling the right to play DG to Player B does not always lead 
to less punishment as hypothesized in this study. These results also conflicts with the finding of Coffman [14] that 
the indirect intermediation reduces the punishment and thus lessons the responsibility for the unethical violation 
behavior. It seems that third party (Player D) punishment for keeping money at the expense of a poorer player 
(Player C) does not necessarily decrease when an intermediary actor (Player B) is included in the game. Rather, the 
results above are in agreement with the findings on behavioral economics or cognitive psychology on punishment 
and fairness that we tend to punish intermediation more severely and frequently [2],[8],[16],[17].     
The experimental paradigm in this study was similar to Coffman [14]. In spite of this, a conflicting result was 
obtained. It might be difficult to identify definitely the reason, a cross cultural difference between the West 
(participants in Coffman [14]) and the East (participants in this study) might be functioning, and yielded a 
conflicting result. It might be postulated that the participants in this study paid more emphasis on the outcome than 
on the intermediation, while the participants in Coffman [14] paid more emphasis on the unfairness of 
intermediation by letting Player B play DG instead of Player A.
On the other hand, for B:D=$15:$15 (instruction condition), Player D’s amount of punishment to Player A in the 
indirect condition was smaller than that in the direct condition when the profit of Player A was more than $6 (see 
Fig.4(b)). This agreed with the result of Coffman [14] that the punishment to the indirect condition gets smaller 
when the reward of Players B and D was larger than other condition. 
As hypothesized, only when the participants were instructed to place great emphasis on properly monitoring the 
behavior of Player A and decide how much the participants punish the behavior of Player A on the basis of the 
careful monitoring of Player A’s behavior, Player D punished Player A more severely for the unsold condition 
(direct condition) than for the sold condition (intermediation (indirect) condition) when the reward of Player B and 
Player D was higher. In other words, the strategy on the evaluation of Player A by Player D might change according 
to the reward of Player B and Player D. 
These results mean that the punishment to the indirectness does not always get smaller. The punishment to the 
indirectness gets smaller only when the reward by Players B and D are larger. In conclusion, the hypothesis that the 
indirect intermediation reduces the punishment and thus lessons the responsibility for the unethical violation 
behavior is true only for the limited condition. Therefore, we must be very careful when interpreting such 
intermediated violation or unethical behavior.
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